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Edward J. Kane

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Edward J. Kane is Professor of Finance at Boston College. From 1972 to 1992 he held the Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics at Ohio State University. A founding member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Kane rejoined the organization in 2005. He served for twelve years as a trustee and member of the finance committee of Teachers Insurance. Currently, he consults for the World Bank and is a senior fellow in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Center for Financial Research. Previously, Kane has consulted for numerous agencies, including the IMF, components of the Federal Reserve System, and three foreign central banks. He consulted as well for the Congressional Budget Office, the Joint Economic Committee, and the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress. He is a past president and fellow of the American Finance Association and a former Guggenheim fellow. He also served as president of the International Atlantic Economic Society and the North American Economics and Finance Association. Kane is a longtime research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He has authored three books and coauthored or coedited several more. He has published widely in professional journals and currently serves on seven editorial boards. He received a BS from Georgetown University and a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

By this expert

Unpacking and Reorienting Executive Subcultures of Modern Finance

Paper Conference paper | | Apr 2015

Recent weeks have surfaced an intense exchange of top-level finger pointing, both between Congress and the leadership of the Federal Reserve System, between Fed officials and executives in the private sector and within the Fed between the Board of Governors and the New York Reserve Bank.

The Flummery of Capital-Requirement Repairs Since The Crisis

Article | Sep 15, 2014

Government safety nets give protected institutions an implicit subsidy and intensify incentives for value-maximizing boards and managers to risk the ruin of their firms. Standard accounting statements do not record the value of this subsidy and forcing subsidized institutions to show more accounting capital will do little to curb their enhanced appetite for tail risk.

Please Don't Throw Me In The Briar Patch

Paper Working paper | | Sep 2014

The flummery of capital-requirement repairs undertaken in response to the Great Financial Crisis.

Featuring this expert

The Gift of Deregulation

Article | Dec 14, 2015

‘Tis the season to celebrate gift giving. But for big banks Santa Claus comes all the time, in the form of handsomely wrapped subsidies and subtly packaged regulatory nuances worth more more gold than the wildest dreams of the Three Wise Men.

Bankers Think They Have an Ethical Duty to Steal From Taxpayers

Article | Jun 16, 2015

It doesn’t make sense to pay someone to rob you.

Beyond Dodd-Frank

Video | Aug 3, 2014

Has the Dodd-Frank Act had its intended effect?

Measuring Systemic Risk To Empower the Taxpayer

Video | Aug 22, 2011

Banks take on excessive risk since they know, in case of failure, the taxpayer will step in to rescue them. That is a form of free insurance, and Ed Kane wants to end it.